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Ant6nio de Moura Borges*
HE Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) is a development of
the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative announced by President
George Bush in 1990, which consisted of three pillars: (1) reduc-
tion of trade barriers; (2) increased investment in the region; and (3) debt
relief. The process of creating the FTAA actually began in 1994, when
President Bill Clinton took the initiative of inviting the Heads of State
and of the Government of the Americas, with the exception of Cuba, to
the Summit of the Americas. The Summit was held in Miami, Florida,
and thirty-four democratic Western Hemisphere nations committed
themselves to pursuing the creation of the FTAA by the year 2005. The
FTAA would be the largest free trade area in the world, but negotiations
aimed at its creation have been difficult given the extreme political, cul-
tural, and economic dissimilarities among the Western Hemisphere na-
tions. In order to effectively create the FTAA by next year with the
participation of all negotiating countries, the demands of Brazil and the
United States must be reconciled. Brazil and its partners in
MERCOSUR propose that the FTAA concentrate on market access and
the elimination of import tariffs on all products in fifteen years. The
United States and its partners in the Group of Fourteen (G 14) will not
agree to the total elimination of tariffs and demand more concessions,
especially in the areas of services, investments and government
procurement.
This article was first presented as a Shihata Distinguished Lecture for
the SMU Law Institute of the Americas and the London Forum for Inter-
national Economic Law and Development, delivered on March 24, 2004.
The lecture was also sponsored by the SMU International Law Society.
For that opportunity, I thank Professor John Attanasio, Dean of the SMU
Dedman School of Law; Professor Joseph Norton, President of the Law
Institute of the Americas; Yolanda Eiseinstein, President of the Interna-
tional Law Society; my long time Brazilian friend Professor Marcos Aur-
lio Pereira Valaddo, Research Fellow of the Law Institute of the
Americas and a Doctorate candidate at SMU Dedman School of Law;
Professor of Law at the University of Brasflia School of Law and at the Catholic
University of Brasilia School of Law; Attorney of the Brazilian National Treasury;
Doctor of Laws 1991, University of Sio Paulo (Brazil); Master of Comparative
Law 1980, Southern Methodist University; Bachelor of Laws 1979, Federal Univer-
sity of Pernambuco (Brazil).
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and CAPES, a Foundation subordinated to the Ministry of Education of
Brazil, for the generous financial support which allowed me to do re-
search at the Georgetown University Law Center, as a Visiting Scholar. I
am also grateful for comments from Christopher J. Ballantyne.
I. INTRODUCTION
At the first Summit of the Americas, held in Miami, Florida, in Decem-
ber 1994, the leaders of the thirty-four democratic Western Hemisphere
nations, the entire hemisphere with the exception of Cuba, undertook the
responsibility of creating the FTAA by the year 2005. Despite years of
negotiations, important issues remain unsolved. The apparent inflexibil-
ity of the negotiators in relation to certain controversial themes gives rise
to preoccupations about compliance with the date established for the cre-
ation of the FTAA, the extent to which the FTAA will or will not com-
prise all negotiating countries, and whether the very creation of the
FTAA will occur at all.
In this article, I will discuss the importance of the FTAA, Brazilian
concerns in the negotiating process, and the prospects of the FTAA.
It is well known that the main difficulties that exist for the full imple-
mentation of the FTAA revolve around the conflicting positions of the
United States and Brazil on many crucial aspects of the agreement.
Needless to say, the views that I will present are my own, and they may
not coincide with the views of the Brazilian Government. In fact, I did
not vote for President Luiz Indcio Lula da Silva. I served as a Legal Ad-
viser to former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso.
The Brazilian Ambassador to the United States, Rubens Barbosa, has
said, "After five years here, I learned that Brazil is like Texas. We are
big, we think we are bigger than we really are and we are always at odds
with the United States."'
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE FTAA
Attempts to create a free trade area among all, or almost all, States of
the Western Hemisphere are not recent. In 1967, the Conference of
American Presidents (also known as the Punta del Este Conference),
convened in Punta del Este, Uruguay, to call for hemispheric free trade.2
The situation at that time was not favorable for the creation of such an
enterprise. The Cold War demanded the special attention of the United
States, and many Latin American countries were under nationalistic mili-
tary regimes. However, the failure to achieve any notable result was at-
tributed primarily to the differences between the United States and its
neighbors to the South. 3
1. Nora Boustany, Diplomatic Dispatches, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2004, at A24.
2. See Mark B. Baker, Integration of the Americas: A Latin Renaissance or a Prescrip-
tion for Disaster?, 11 TEMP. INT'L & Comp. L. J. 309, 322 (1997); FRANCISCO DE
Assis GRIECO, A SUPREMACIA AMERICANA E A ALcA 267 (Aduaneiras 1998).
3. Baker, supra note 2, at 311-18.
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In a different national and international political context, on June 27,
1990, President George Bush announced the Enterprise for the Americas
Initiative, which consisted of three pillars: reduction of trade barriers; in-
creased investment in the region; and debt relief.4 However, the process
of creating the FTAA actually began in 1994, when President Bill Clinton
formally invited the Heads of State and of the Government of the Ameri-
cas, with the exception of Cuba, to the first Summit of the Americas, held
in Miami from December 9 - 11. 5 At the Summit, the leaders of the
thirty-four democratic Western Hemisphere nations,6 with the exception
of Cuba, committed themselves to pursuing the creation of the FTAA by
the year 2005. With this goal, two basic documents were adopted - the
Miami Summit's Declaration of Principles and the Plan of Action. The
Declaration of Principles set forth the following five commitments: (1)
partnership for development and prosperity: democracy, free trade and
sustainable developments in the Americas; (2) preserve and strengthen
the community of democracies of the Americas; (3) promote prosperity
through economic integration and free trade; (4) eradicate poverty and
discrimination in our hemisphere; and (5) guarantee sustainable develop-
ment and conserve our natural environment for future generations.7
Since then, three more Summits of the Americas have been held: (1) the
second in Santiago, Chile, in 1998; (2) the third in Quebec, Canada, in
2001; and (3) the fourth in Monterrey, Mexico, on January 13, 2004.8
Much work has been done to accomplish the objectives of creating the
hemispheric free trade area. Eight FTAA Trade Ministerial Meetings
have been held,9 as well as sixteen Meetings of the Trade Negotiations
Committee and numerous meetings of each of the nine Negotiating
Groups. The last meetings were assisted by the Tripartite Committee,
consisting of the Inter-American Bank (IDB), the Organization of Amer-
ican States (OAS), and the United Nations Economic Commission for
4. See Brandy A. Bayer, Expansion of NAFTA: Issues and Obstacles Regarding Ac-
cession by Latin American States and Associations, 26 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 615,
622 (1997); TULLO VIGEVANI & MARCELO PASSINI MARIANO, ALCA: 0 Gi-
GANTE E OS ANOES 21-24 (Senac S~o Paulo 2003).
5. Christopher M. Bruner, Hemispheric Integration and the Politics of Regionalism:
The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1,
2 (2002).
6. The nations are: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize,
Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Re-
public, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Ja-
maica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Vicent and the
Grenadines, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uru-
guay, the United States of America, and Venezuela. See Free Trade Area of the
Americas - FTAA, Links to FTAA Countries, available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org
(last visited July 16, 2004).
7. See Free Trade Area of the Americas - FFAA, First Summit of the Americas: Dec-
laration of Miami, available at http:/lwww.ftaa-alca.org/Summits/Miami/declarae.
asp (Dec. 19, 1994).
8. See Free Trade Area of the Americas - FTAA, Summits of the Ameicas, at http://
www.ftaa-alca.org/Summits-e.asp (last visited July 16, 2004).
9. See Free Trade Area of the Americas - FTAA, FTAA Trade Ministerial Meetings,
at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/Minis-e.asp (last visited July 16, 2004).
698 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 10
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). The Negotiating Groups,
as established in the San Jos6 Ministerial Declaration in March 1998, are
Market Access, Agriculture, Government Procurement, Investment,
Competition Policy, Intellectual Property Rights, Services, Dispute Set-
tlement, and Subsidies, Antidumping and Countervailing Duties.10
III. BRAZILIAN CONCERNS
If implemented, the FTAA would be the largest free trade area in the
world, with a population of 800 million people, 14 percent of the planet's
population, and a gross domestic product of over $12 trillion, 31 percent
of the world's wealth. 1 However, the political, cultural, and economic
differences among the thirty-four founding States are enormous. The
area includes countries like Haiti, on the one hand, and the United States,
on the other hand. Currently, Haiti is politically unstable, has a gross
domestic product of only $2.8 billion, and a gross domestic product per
capita of $354.12 The United States is the greatest political, military, and
economic power in the world, with a gross domestic product of $10,427.4
trillion in 2002,13 "amounting to nearly four-fifths of total GDP for the
entire Western Hemisphere."'' 4
Brazil has a population of 174,630,000, a total area of 8,511,965 sq. Km,
or 3,286,470 square miles, which comprises nearly 50 percent of South
America's land mass, and a gross domestic product of $452.4 billion in
2002.15 It is the world's twelfth largest economy, and some years ago,
Brazil was the world's eighth largest economy. In 1998, Brazil's gross
domestic product was $787.7 billion; however, due to its currency devalu-
ation crisis in 1999, as measured in U.S. dollars, gross domestic product
decreased sharply despite the fact that the growth rate had been about 1.5
percent annually.' 6 "In October 1997, Brazil was able to stave off by it-
self the threat of an attack against its currency in the wake of the Asian
crisis, even though some $10 billion fled the country in a single day."' 17 In
1998, during the Russian crisis, Brazil was not as fortunate. 18
10. Id.
11. Interview with Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim, Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs,
published in REVISTA tIPOCA, Jan. 5, 2004, available at http://www.mre.gov.br
[hereinafter Amorim Interview]; Joe Zopolsky, Implementing the FTAA: A Survey
of Hemispheric Unification Efforts Within the Americas Over the Past Ten Years, 9
WTR CURRENTS INT'L TRADE L. J. 91 (2000).
12. See MARC A. MILES ET AL., 2004 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM 205 (Marc A.
Miles et al eds., Heritage Foundation & Wall Street Journal 2004).
13. See World Bank Group, United States Data Profile, at http://www.worldbank.org/
data/countrydata/countrydata.html (last visited July 16, 2004).
14. Bruner, supra note 5, at 3.
15. See World Bank Group, World Development Indicators (2003), available at http:/
www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2003.
16. See MILES, supra note 12, at 115. The annual GDP growth was 1.3% and 1.9% in
2001 and 2002 respectively. See World Bank Group, WD! Data Query, at http://dev
data.worldbank.org/data-query/ (last visited July 16, 2004).
17. Keith S. Rosenn, Whither Brazil: MERCOSUL and the Devaluation Crisis, 5
NAFTA L. & Bus. REV. AM. 422, 424 (1999).
18. Id.
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Brazil is the largest economy in South America, and the leading part-
ner of MERCOSUR, the Common Market of the Southern Cone, com-
prised of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. MERCOSUR
"accounts for 70 percent of South America's combined gross domestic
product as well as 64 percent of the population,"1 9 and after the Euro-
pean Union (EU) and North American Free Trade Association
(NAFTA), it is the third largest trading bloc in the world.20 "This, in a
sense, raises the stakes of the FTAA for MERCOSUR nations, as they
arguably have more to lose in the way of autonomy achieved, and effort
expended, in subregional integration than do other negotiating na-
tions. ' '2 1 MERCOSUR has achieved significant political and commercial
success,2 2 and is negotiating a free trade agreement with the Andean
Community and the European Union.2 3
Brazil and the United States have a long tradition of friendship and
cooperation, dating back as early as the Second World War, but the size
and development of their economies are greatly distinct. Given the huge
dissimilarities between the United States and their negotiating partners in
the FTAA, one might wonder what benefits the United States would re-
ceive from such a collaboration. According to David M. Gilmore:
Although Latin America is currently only 7 percent of U.S. trade, it
holds the promise of faster, long-term growth and potential to be an im-
portant export market. It also would support long-term merchandise
trade markets, open new trade in service markets and investment mar-
kets, and support continued stability in the hemisphere. 24
Besides, U.S. Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick has said, "If the
Americas are strong, the United States will be better positioned to pursue
its aims around the world. But if our hemisphere is troubled, we will be
19. Zopolsky, supra note 11, at 92.
20. See Bruner, supra note 5, at 26.
21. Id. at 29.
22. Argentina's major export trading partners are: (1) Brazil 28.2%; (2) U.S. 11.1%;
(3) Chile 11%; and (4) Spain 4.1%. Its major import trading partners are: (1) Bra-
zil 36.5%; (2) U.S. 21.3%; (3) Germany 5.5; and (4) Italy 4.4%. Paraguay's major
export trading partners are: (1) Brazil 37.2%; (2) Uruguay 17.1%; and (3) Argen-
tina 3.6%. Its major import trading partners are: (1) Brazil 32.2%; (2) Argentina
20%; and (3) Uruguay 4.3%. Uruguay's major export trading partners are: (1)
Brazil 23.8%; (2) Argentina 18.4%; (3) US 8.9%; and (4) Germany 3.7%. Its ma-
jor import trading partners are: (1) Argentina 23.0%; (2) Brazil 19.1%; (3) US
11.4%; (4) Italy 4.4%; and (5) UK 4.1%. And Brazil's major export trading part-
ners are: (1) U.S. 25.7%; (2) Argentina 11.6%; (3) Germany 5.4%; and (4) Nether-
lands 4.4%. Its major import trading partners are: (1) U.S. 27.4%; (2) Argentina
13.5%; (3) Germany 8.9%; and (4) Japan 5.0%. See MILES, supra note 12, at 81,
115, 325, 407.
23. According to Martfn Redrado, Argentine vice-chancellor and chief MERCOSUR
negotiator, negotiations with the European Union are more advanced than the
negotiations for the creation of the FTAA. See UOL Economia, Cltimas Noticias:
Acordo Mercosul-UE Avanga Mais do que a Alca, available at http://wwwl.uol.
com.br/economiaafpult35u33279.shl (Mar. 12, 2004).
24. David M. Gilmore, Free Trade Area of the Americas: Is it Desirable?, 31 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 383, 414 (2000).
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preoccupied at home and handicapped abroad. '25
In Brazil, government authorities have always stated the importance of
the FTAA, especially in light of Brazil's need to increase exports and the
U. S. market's position as the largest in the world. Since the beginning of
the negotiations, Brazil and its partners in MERCOSUR have worked
towards the creation of the FTAA, concentrating on market access and
having general rules that would respect the capacity of countries to have
their own development models.
The United States is Brazil's largest trading partner, having replaced
the European Union as the main destination market for Brazilian ex-
ports. In 2002, while the European Union accounted for 25.04 percent of
Brazilian exports, the United States accounted for 25.74 percent, of which
more than 75 percent represented manufactured products.26 The United
States is also Brazil's largest import trading partner, accounting for 27.4
percent of Brazilian imports. 27 The FTAA would enhance the opportu-
nity to increase trade between the United States and Brazil.
Brazil's main products are aircraft (the single most important export
product to the United States), bauxite, beef, cellulose, cereals, coffee, co-
coa, crude oil and petrochemicals, diamonds, furniture, gold, households
appliances, hydroelectric power engines, iron ore, manganese, motor ve-
hicles, nickel, orange juice, phosphates, platinum, processed food, quartz
crystals, rubber, shoes, silver, soybeans, steel, sugar, textiles, timber, tin,
titanium, uranium, and zinc.28
Even though manufactured products account for more than 75 percent
of Brazilian exports to the United States, Brazil and the Andean Coun-
tries, are especially interested in market access to agricultural products
through the FTAA negotiations. However, the 2002 U.S. Farm Bill con-
tains $180 billion in agriculture subsidies, 29 and U.S. negotiators have
been unwilling to accept measures that would restrict agricultural
subsidies.30
Without the use of subsidies, Brazilian agriculture was able to develop
and is now the most competitive in the world.31 Among other factors
contributing to Brazil's success, the climate in Brazil is favorable. Brazil
has the lowest per ton cost in several products, such as beef, soybeans,
25. See Bruner, supra note 5, at 68.
26. See Brazilian Embassy, U.S. Tariff Treatment of Main Brazilian Products: Execu-
tive Summary 1, available at http://www.brasilemb.org/tradeinvestment/executive
_summary.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2004) [hereinafter U.S. Tariff Treatment].
27. See MILES, supra note 12, at 115.
28. See Brazilian Embassy, Brazil at a Glance, available at http://www.brasilemb.org/
profile-brazil/profilel.shtml (last visited July 16, 2004).
29. See Laura Altieri, Between Empire and Community: The United States and Multi-
lateralism 2001-2003: A Mid-Term Assessment: Trade and Economic Affairs:
NAFTA and the FTAA: Regional Alternatives to Multilateralism, 21 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 847, 856 (2003).
30. See U.S. Tariff Treatment, supra note 26, at 2.
31. See interview with Roberto Giannetti da Fonseca, former Secretary of Brazil's For-
eign Trade Chamber, published in REVISTA ISTOP , Nov. 5, 2003, at 11.
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sugar, coffee, poultry, shrimp, orange juice, and cotton. 32 Brazil is the
world's largest producer and exporter of coffee, sugar, and orange juice.
It is the second largest producer, and largest exporter of beef and soy-
beans and the second largest producer and exporter of poultry.33
Over the last fifty years, the United States offered the world's largest
and most open market for other countries' exports. This is still true today
because the average United States import tariff is low. 34 However, sev-
eral economic sectors, such as agricultural items and low-value-added
manufactured products, are highly protected through the use of tariff
peaks, tariff escalations, and tariff rate quotas. These methods, in addi-
tion to non-tariff barriers such as antidumping and countervailing mea-
sures, have affected Brazilian exports of steel products. According to the
Brazilian Embassy:
The tangible impact on Brazil of this selective U.S. protectionism can
be illustrated by a comparison between Brazil's average nominal import
tariff on the 20 top U.S. global export products, which was 11.54% in
2002, and the average nominal U.S. import tariff on the 20 top Brazilian
global export products, which was 44.4% in 2002.3 5
In large part, this was a result of the high tariff equivalent rate on fro-
zen orange juice, which in 2002 was 52 percent, and the extra-quota tariff
equivalents of 234 percent for raw sugar, 208 percent for refined sugar,
and 350 percent for tobacco in 2002.36 Furthermore, as stated by the Bra-
zilian Embassy, "[T]he U.S. market is closed to Brazilian poultry prod-
ucts for sanitary reasons, even though Brazil is the world's second largest
exporter," and as for beef, which Brazil is the world's largest exporter,
the United State's extra-quota tariff is 26.4 percent, but the certification
of Brazilian unprocessed beef exports to the United States was not issued
until the end of 2003, even though the administrative procedures for such
a purpose had been underway since the year 2000.3 7
Brazil, along with its partners in MERCOSUR, have asked for the
elimination of import tariffs on all products, agricultural and non-agricul-
tural, so that within fifteen years the Americas could become an area free
of import tariffs; however, the United States is more interested in the
areas of services, intellectual properties, investments, and government
procurement. According to the Brazilian Foreign Minister, Celso
Amorim, it is in these areas that the Brazilian Government wishes to
maintain sufficient autonomy to implement development policies, 38 such
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See CHRISTIAN LOHBAUER, ALCA: UMA PERSPECTIVA DOS DESAFIOS Do BRASIL,
in 0 BRASIL E A ALCA: Os DESAFIOS DA INTEGRA(IO 243 (Alberto do Amaral
Junior & Michelle Ratton Sanchez eds., Aduaneiras, 2003).
35. See U.S. Tariff Treatment, supra note 26, at 1.
36. Id. at 2-3.
37. Id. at 2.
38. See Cl6vis Rossi, Com6rcio Exterior, available at http://wwwl.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/
dinheiro/fi1502200422.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2004).
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as certain industrial policy instruments that developed countries use. 39
Specific examples include the Buy American Act of 1933 and the Small
Business Act of 1953. A large part of American government purchases
consists of arms and military equipment restricted by law to local suppli-
ers. Brazilian government purchases of military equipment are not high,
but the Brazilian Foreign Minister understands that it does not impede
the country to specify certain items that must be supplied by Brazilian
companies aimed at sector development. 40
In the United States, there are service sector restrictions, especially in
the areas of telecommunications and finance, mainly at the state level,
and constraints on foreign investment and foreign participation in gov-
ernment procurement biddings. According to the Brazilian Embassy:
Foreign investors may not hold more than a total of 49% of the owner-
ship shares of U.S. airlines, nor more than 25% of all voting stock. U.S.
cabotage shipping is restricted to vessels that were built in the U.S. and
are operated with U.S. owners, flag and crew. The U.S. fishing industry is
permitted to use only vessels built in the United States. U.S. agricultural
products may be exported only on U.S.-flag ships, which thus constitutes
a completely protected shipping market. The 'Buy American Act' of
1933 also establishes a preference for U.S. suppliers that applies to many
government purchases. 41
Throughout the FTAA negotiations, Brazil and the other
MERCOSUR members have defended the position that subjects of a sys-
temic and normative nature should be dealt with within the World Trade
Organization (WTO). They take the view that it does not make sense for
the United States and the European Union to have rules about intellec-
tual property, investments, and services that differ so widely. 42
Brazilian authorities believe the FTAA is basically a negotiation with
the United States and Canada. 43 Brazil does not need the FFAA to reach
markets in other countries, as the United States already has a free trade
agreement with Canada and Mexico. Except for Argentina, the remain-
ing countries are very small and are not interested in negotiating. 44 Thus,
since November 1, 2002, and until the conclusion of the negotiations, Bra-
zil and the United States are the Co-Chairs of the FTAA Negotiations.
IV. PROSPECTS OF THE FTAA
Negotiations towards the creation of the FTAA have not been easy.
At the Eighth Trade Ministerial Meeting held in Miami, Florida, in No-
vember 2003, an agreement was reached to create a "lite" version of the
39. See Amorim Interview, supra note 11, at 2.
40. Id.
41. See U.S. Tariff Treatment, supra note 26, at 4.
42. See interview with Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim, Brazilian Minister of Foreign Rela-
tions, published in REVISTA VEJA, January 28, 2004, available at http://www.mre.
gov.br/portugues/politica externaldiscursos/discurso detalhe.asp?IDDISC.
43. See Amorim Interview, supra note 11, at 2.
44. Id.
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FTAA in which there would be a common set of rights and obligations
binding the thirty-four contracting nations without more ambitious multi-
lateral agreements of a binding nature.
Nevertheless, a minimum agreement to set up the FTAA has not yet
been reached. The lack of conciliation on specific issues caused a recess
of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Trade Negotiations Committee, held in
Puebla, Mexico, last February. It was agreed the meeting would be con-
tinued March 17 - 19, 2004, and the recess would be used to give time for
the nine Negotiating Groups to be instructed as to the clear reach of the
general treaty negotiations and the definition of the multilateral negotia-
tions procedures.45 At the request of the negotiating parties, these dates
were postponed to April 22 - 23, 2004, because the South American vice-
chancellors, representing MERCOSUR, the Andean Community and
Chile, could not reach a consensus at a meeting held last March in Bue-
nos Aires, Argentina. The negotiating parties will meet again March 31 -
April 1, 2004.46
The success of the negotiations now depends on reconciling the de-
mands of the G 14,47 led by the United States, with those of the other
countries. In relation to market access, the MERCOSUR proposal is that
all import tariffs be eliminated in fifteen years, and the G 14 prefers the
elimination of tariffs substantially on all trade. MERCOSUR nations do
not agree with the G 14's proposal, for that would give rise to the contin-
ued protection of beef, orange juice, steel, sugar, and no more than
twenty other products in which the South American countries are mostly
interested in. At the last day of the Meeting in Puebla, in order to recon-
cile those demands, a new formula was proposed that could be the solu-
tion for the impasse: the text would require a substantial increase in
access to the markets of the thirty-four partners of the FTAA.48
MERCOSUR would yield in its position because the tariff elimination
would not be total, and the G 14 would also yield in its position because a
guarantee of substantial increase in access to the partners' markets would
not allow countries to keep protecting their markets the way they do now.
However, other questions remain, especially concerning services, intel-
lectual property, investments, and government procurement. Brazilian
Foreign Minister Amorim has affirmed that he is optimistic about the
continuation of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Trade Negotiations Com-
mittee to take place in Puebla April 22 - 23, 2004, for he asked the U.S.
Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick if the United States was inter-
ested in the Brazilian market of goods, and he answered "yes, obvi-
45. See Portal EXAME, Economia, available at http://portalexame.abril.uol.com.br/
economia/conteudo_30278.shtml (last visited Aug. 25, 2004).
46. See id.
47. The G 14 consists of the United States, Canada, Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, and Chile.
48. See Rossi, supra note 38, at 2.
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ously.' ' 49 If there is this interest, Amorim feels there is no reason for the
United States and the other members of the G 14 to insist on concessions
in areas other than market access.50 This fact alone does not seem to be
enough ground for optimism.
Brazil is a democratic country and, as in the United States, government
decisions depend on the Legislative Branch's approval and are motivated
by social support. Some Brazilian Senators and Congressmen are op-
posed to the FTAA because of ideological reasons, concrete material in-
terests, and certain economic and international political analysis.
However, the vast majority of Brazilians approve or disapprove of the
FTAA based on its outcome and its effect on Brazilian society as a
whole.51 As in the United States, most labor unions in Brazil are against
the FTAA.52
I conclude these remarks using Professor Joseph J. Norton's words
about the FITAA, with which I agree, when he affirmed that:
[O]n a current basis, the scenario is most difficult to evaluate (politi-
cally, economically and financially). But what can be evaluated as it
continues to unfold is the overall process itself and its direct and in-
direct consequences. This will assume a continued general sharing of
common intergovernmental objectives; good faith collaboration and
consultations respecting the various FTAA Working Groups, Minis-




51. See VIGEVANI & MARIANO, supra note 4, at 112-14.
52. Id.
53. Joseph J. Norton, Doing Business under the FTAA: Reflections of a U.S. Business
Lawyer, 6 NAFTA L. & Bus. REV. AM. 21, 433 (2000).
